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Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform:  
Avoidance, Error and Overreaching in Sunstein et al.’s Punitive Damages (2002)  
 
Neil Vidmar 
 
Duke Law School 
 
 
“The present empirical studies of all stages of the punitive damages decision show that the major 
locus of unreliability and disorder in punitive damages decisions is in jurors’ assessments of an 
appropriate dollar award.” 
 
  Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How Jurors Decide (2002) 
 
 
“When you come to a word or sentence you do not understand, or that is unfamiliar to you, it is not 
permissible to just say ‘grasshopper’ and jump over it. You are in danger of losing the meaning of 
what you are reading.” 
 
 Elementary school teacher, Maple Street School, Gillespie, Illinois, circa 1950 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 This article addresses tort reform claims made in Cass R. Sunstein, Reid Hastie, John W. 
Payne, David A. Schkade and W. Kip Viscusi in Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide1 and related 
articles, research that was largely underwritten by the Exxon Corporation. 2 Based upon a series of 
simulation experiments, those authors have made a general claim that jur ies are incapable of making 
coherent judgments about punitive damages. In this article I raise serious methodological problems 
                                                 
1 Cass Sunstein et al. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002) (hereinafter  “Punitive Damages”). 
2 See Amon, Exxon Bankrolls Critics of Punitives, Then It Cites the Research in Appeal of $5.3 Billion Valdez Award, 
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 17, 1999; Alan Zarembo, Funding Studies to Suit the Need; In the 1990s , Exxon 
Began Paying for Research into Juries and the Damages They award . The Findings Have Served the Firm Well in 
Court, LOS ANGELES TIMES, December 3, 2003; William R. Freudenburg, The Intersection of Corporate Cash , 
Science and the Law: Toward a Closer Examination, Paper Abstract , Session on Law and Society: Legal Institutions 
and Processes, Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 16, 2003. I raise here, in truth not 
very subtly, the role of Exxon in funding the studies. However, I leave for another day, and perhaps for other writers, 
the issue of the role of Exxon in vetting which studies would be funded and which not, the use of the studies in 
Exxon’s own litigation, the fact that most of the experiments, albeit not all, were published in student-edited law 
reviews rather than in peer-reviewed social science journals, and other matters. These issues deserve more extensive 
treatment, see, e.g. see Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight Bias, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social 
Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 867, 868-71, including note 16 (1999). However, in the remainder 
of this article I limit myself to addressing on their own merits the research experiments and the authors’ conclusions  
from those experiments.    
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bearing on the validity of the research, and, therefore, its ability to provide judges and legislators 
with useful information about juries and punitive damages.    
  The principal conclusion about juries is stated in the concluding chapter of Punitive 
Damages: 
The many systematic patterns of behavior that we observed are convincing 
evidence of the jurors’ conscientiousness. Nonethe less, the legally 
required decision tasks often seemed to exceed their individual and social 
capacities. The decision task is not well defined by jury instructions; jurors 
are not provided with the necessary background information or 
experiences to make reliable judgments; and inherent cognitive limitations 
interfered with their performance of the specific judgments prescribed by 
our punitive damages system. Jurors’ good intentions and high levels of 
motivation were thwarted by the inherent complexity of the legal decision 
task and by the lack of clear instructions or other effective guidance. The 
result is a decision process that is unreliable, erratic and unpredictable.3 
 
Based on the above conclusions, the book makes a policy recommendation that would 
remove punitive damages decisions entirely from the jury: “…serious consideration should be given 
to moving away from the jury and toward a system of civil fines, perhaps through a damages 
schedule of the sort that has been used in many areas of the law, including workers’ compensation 
and environmental violations.”4 
These claims take place at a time and context in which the Supreme Court and lower courts 
have struggled with developing legal doctrine to address outlier awards involving punitive damages.5 
Simultaneously, state and federal legislators are considering reforms to the American tort system that 
also involve punitive damages. The authors of Punitive Damages are all eminent scholars in their 
fields and, combined with the problem of outlier awards, their conclusions have gained the attention 
of courts and policy makers. Punitive Damages and articles upon which the book draws have been 
cited by the Exxon Corporation in its own litigation6 and in amicus briefs before the Supreme 
                                                 
3 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 241. To be fair, in the final two paragraphs of the book Cass Sunstein  cautiously states that 
“[o]ur findings do not point directly to social reforms, but in the next paragraph they further conclude that, “[i]f our 
findings are correct, perhaps the ideal system of punitive damages would not involve juries or even judges, but 
specialists in the subject matter at hand, who would be able to create clear guidelines for punitive awards,”  at 258.  
4 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 242; see also 257.  
5 E.g. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell  , 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Cooper Industries, Inc 
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996);  
6 In Re The Exxon Corp. et al., U.S. Ct. App., 9th Cir. No. 97-35191 (1997); American Tort Reform Association, 
Amicus Brief in Support of Appellants Exxon Corporation et.al, in In Re The Exxon Corp. et al., U.S. Ct. App., 9th Cir. 
No. 97-35191 (1997). 
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Court.7  Punitive Damages or the original articles upon which it is based, have been cited in dictum 
by the Supreme Court.8 Some lower courts have recently treated the book as social science authority.  
In In re Simon II Litigation, for example, Judge Weinstein stated: 
…in a pathbreaking empirical multidisciplinary study, How Juries Decide, 
the authors demonstrated that, while jurors can agree on the degree of moral 
and ethical features of defendants who cause massive harm, conscientious as 
they are, they have no criteria or standards enabling them to translate their 
findings into dollar amounts….Based on this research we can expect 
relatively uniform assessments of compensatory damages in tobacco cases, 
but widely variant damages that will be appreciably higher when awarded 
by local juries than by juries in a national class action… 9  
 
In TVT Records v. Island Jam Music one of the articles that forms a part of Punitive Damages is 
quoted as authority. 10  
 Critiques of individual articles in the Exxon body of research have appeared in the 
academic literature.11 An amicus brief submitted in State Farm v. Campbell 12 signed by twenty-
one social scientists and legal scholars, including the present author, one of the drafters of the 
brief, offered their professional opinion that the broad policy claims of the Exxon-funded authors 
were not justified.13  
Yet, for several reasons there is a serious danger that these critiques will be ignored by 
judges, legislators and other policy makers. First, the “outlier” awards involving high punitive to 
                                                 
7 Brief of Certain Leading Business Corporations as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell  , 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
8 Cooper Industries, Inc v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439 (2001) 
9 In re Simon II Litigation, 211 F.R.D. 86,106 (2002). Punitive Damages if further cited at 110 and 161 
10 TVT Records v. Island Jam Music , 279 F. Supp. 2d 413  (2003): at 417 quoting Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, 
Assessing Punitive Damages ( With Notes on Cognition and Valuation) 107 YALE LAW JOURNAL 2071 (1998) 
“…juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts  bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm 
caused;” and at 430: “[A]risk of extremely high awards is likely to produce excessive caution in risk-averse 
companies. Hence unpredictable awards create both unfairness and …inefficiency, in a way that may overdeter 
desirable activity.” 
11 see Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight Bias, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for 
Change, 48 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 867, 877 (1999); Neil Vidmar, Juries Don’t Make Legal Decisions! And Other 
Problems: A Critique of Hastie et al. on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 705 (1999); Robert 
MacCoun, Epistemological Dilemmas in the Assessment of Legal Decision Making, 23 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
723 (1999); Steven Garber, Punitive Damages and Deterrence of Efficiency-Promoting Analysis: A Problem Without 
A Solution 52 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1809 (2000); Robert MacCoun , The Costs and Benefits of Letting Juries 
Punish Corporations : Comment on Viscusi, 52 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1821,1827 (2000). 
12 123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003). 
13 Brief of Amici Curiae of Certain Leading Social Scientists and Legal Scholars in Support of Respondents, State 
Farm  (No.01-1289). Professor Theodore Eisenberg and I drafted the amicus. Many of the ideas and critiques in this 
article overlap with parts of that amicus. However, the views that I express in this article are solely my own;  I make 
no representation that the co-signers of the amicus necessarily agree with my views expressed in this article.   
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compensatory damages ratios that have been caused the Supreme Court to struggle with legal 
doctrine and that have garnered so much attention in the mass media may be seen as the result of 
typical jury behavior that is consistent with the claims of Punitive Damages and its authors. 
Second, the eminence of the authors and their prolific outpouring of articles may create the 
impression of general scientific consensus about their conclusions. Third, the authors’ claim that 
the studies involved “thousands of jury-eligible citizens, on hundreds of mock juries, and on a few 
hundred experienced trial judges asked to render punitive damages and verdicts under realistic task 
conditions”14 is likely to preempt close scrutiny of the research methodology. 15  Similar to a failure 
to read the fine print in a contract, judges and legislators may say “grasshopper” and hastily jump 
ahead to the conclusions of Punitive Damages.16 They will be in error.   
Two important reviews of Punitive Damages have recently appeared. Professor Catherine 
Sharkey has challenged whether the authors of the book have sufficiently considered the societal 
deterrence and compensatory functions of punitive damages.17 These goals of punitive damages 
have been minimized, ignored or rejected in the simulation experiments. She also pointed out that 
the authors neglect the role of institutional context and appellate review in controlling extreme jury 
awards.18  Based on her analysis she argued that, while the authors of Punitive Damages “have 
done an admirable job of producing and analyzing empirical data, their policy prescriptions go too 
far in using that data to castigate the jury, and not far enough in suggesting logical reforms within 
our existing system.”19 She also argued that the “call to banish the jury in the realm of punitive 
damages is at best premature, at least on the basis of their empirical findings.”20 
                                                 
14  PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 211. 
15 The sheer number of experiments as well as the number of subjects used in the research are likely to impress even 
careful scholars and judges. For instance, Professor Catherine Sharkey’s review of  Punitive Damages, while critical of 
aspects of the research, states that “[t]he sheer scope the collective research endeavor is unprecedented,” and  “draws 
upon experimental research based upon twenty experimental studies involving more than 8,000 jury-eligible citizens 
and more than 600 mock juries,.” Catherine Sharkey, Punitive Damages: Should Jurors Decide?  82  TEXAS LAW 
REVIEW 382, 386 (2003).     
16 This is not to say that judges are incapable of reading the methodology  or putting it into context, merely that their 
attention is centered on the legal issues. However, as I will show, some of the methodological issues are subtle and 
might easily escape even a careful judge not trained in social science research.   
17 Catherine Sharkey, Punitive Damages: Should Jurors Decide?  82  TEXAS LAW REVIEW 382,400 (2003); see also 
Catherine Sharkey,, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE . L. J. 347 (2003). 
18 Sharkey, Punitive Damages at 404. See also, Neil Vidmar, supra note 11 at 711.  In his introduction to PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES, Professor George Priest briefly acknowledges judicial review in a footnote,  see PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 16, 
note 17.  
19Sharkey , Should Jurors Decide, supra  note 17 at  383.(Scientists use the word data as a plural and datum to refer to 
the singular but Sharkey’s reference to “that data” rather than “those data” reflects a contemporary   trend in lay usage 
of “data”.)  
20 Id. at 385. 
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Professor Neal Feigenson conducted an extensive review of Punitive Damages. 21 He noted 
that the book should have given greater attention to real world research on punitive damages and to 
the normative criteria against which jury decisions should be judged. He also documented 
shortcomings of some of the experiments. While acknowledging that many of the findings from 
the experiments seem consistent with other research findings, he concluded that “…in various 
ways, generally small in themselves but cumulatively hard to ignore –sometimes in the design of 
the experiments, more frequently in the language employed to characterize their findings and in the 
selective use (or more often, neglect) of other empirical data to provide a context for their 
findings—the authors’ normative position leads them to present their results tendentiously.”22  
Feigenson’s critique also offered the view that Punitive Damages’ emphasis on optimal 
deterrence to the exclusion of retribution as an additional purpose of punitive damages limits the 
usefulness of its conclusions.23  
The Sharkey and Feigenson articles should be read carefully because they present a 
compelling critique of aspects of the research in Punitive Damages. I am in agreement with almost 
all of their basic conclusions, but in this article I go much further.  
First, I draw attention to Feigenson’s observation that there are data from the real world 
that do not support the broad conclusion that juries are incompetent and unreliable and anti-
business.24 The failure of the authors of Punitive Damages to address this body of data is a serious 
shortcoming. I then turn to critical aspects of the simulation experiments that are not sufficiently 
engaged in the Feigenson and Sharkey reviews, namely the extent to which the simulation 
experiments in Punitive Damages replicate the real world of the jury trial and the context in which 
juries make decisions, a problem that social scientists label “ecological validity.” As my analysis 
will show, the evidence and arguments in the simulation “trials” were not only very brief but, 
                                                 
21 Neal Feigenson, Can Tort Juries Punish Competently? 78 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 101 (2002). 
22 Id. at 105. 
23 Id. at 147. 
24 Id. at 244, 250-5, 255-56.  Throughout the program of research various of the authors have asserted or implied that 
jurors are anti-business. See PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 64, 73, 113-14, 233. In an article published prior to the book 
Hastie et al, A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Punitive Damages, 22 LAW AND HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 287 (1998), a conclusion Vidmar, supra note 11 at 712,  I found not supportable from their data. I do not 
address this matter further in this article but the reader is referred generally to Valerie Hans, BUSINESS ON TRIAL 
(2000), especially Chapters 5, 6 and  7, for research showing that jurors are not inherently anti-business nor do they 
make compensatory awards based on the wealth of the defendant, the so-called “deep pockets” effect though they do 
sometimes hold businesses to higher standards of accountability. See also, Robert MacCoun, Differential Treatment of 
Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the “Deep Pockets” Hypothesis, 30 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 
121 (1966); Neil Vidmar, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY 
INCOMPETENCE , DEEP POCKETS,  AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS (1995) at Chapter 18, pp.203-220.     
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additionally, excluded features of real trials, such as arguments and counter-damage proposals by 
the defendant. Further, there are serious problems with the design of some of the experiments. The 
imbalance of information provided to the simulating jurors overwhelmingly favored the plaintiff 
and undermined the various experiments’ ability to allow scientifically appropriate causal 
inferences. These omissions and commissions raise serious doubts about conclusions that can be 
drawn from Punitive Damages.  
 Before turning to the task of examining the methodology in Punitive Damages two matters 
need to be emphasized as strongly as possible. First, this article does not take issue with the 
Supreme Court’s attempts to address the issue of “outlier” punitive damages awards, particularly 
the concern with the ratios between punitive and compensatory damages.25  I leave doctrine to 
judges, except insofar as the doctrine is based on false empirical assumptions.  
Second, this article is not a condemnation of experimental simulation research. 26 
Simulation experiments can shed important light on basic individual or group decision processes.. 
Sometimes they are the only practical way to investigate an important legal issue; combined with 
other data, they can yield data having direct policy or fact implications. 27  The issue regarding 
Punitive Damages  is whether it is permissible to make broad sweeping policy statements from the 
simulation research reported in the volume, no matter how many experiments were undertaken or 
how prominent the authors are, when those data are contradicted by real world data, when the 
experiments leave out or distort features that are inherent parts of real world juries’ decision-
making contexts and when there are confounds in the experimental designs that prejudice the 
researchers’ ability to draw valid causal inferences. 
A comment on terminology. Throughout this article many references are made to the 
persons who participated as subjects in research studies. There are many conventions for labeling 
                                                 
25 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,517 U.S. 559 (1996); Cooper Tool Industries Inc v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. 
121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001); State Farm v. Campbell ; See also Marcia Coyle, New Battles Come over Punitives: High 
Court’s Guides Include Ratios 25 NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL PA1, April 14,2003. 
26 Indeed, my own vita contains a substantial number of published studies involving jury simulations and I have cited 
experimental simulation  research in legal testimony when it is consistent with other evidence: see , e.g. Neil Vidmar, 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY:  CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP 
POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS, U. of Michigan Press , 1995  at Chapter s 18 and 19 and Vidmar 
Case Studies of Pre -and Midtrial Prejudice in Criminal and Civil Litigation, LAW AND HUMAN   BEHAVIOR, 26, 73 
(2002) http://www.law.duke.edu/pub/vidmar/pretrialPublicity.pdf>     
27 E.g. see, Shari Diamond and Judith Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and Testing Jury Instructions. 
79 JUDICATURE 224 (1996); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups 
and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 603 (1998).   
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these persons: “subjects,” “respondents,” “simulating jurors,” “jurors” and “persons.”  I use these 
various terms interchangeably.    
 
II. Punitive Damages in the Real World 
 One of the most striking observations that can be made about Punitive Damages is the 
paucity of references the authors make to real world studies of the incidence and magnitude of 
punitive damages. More than a few such studies do exist and one cannot but wonder why those 
findings are ignored, particularly since they do not lend support to Punitive Damages’ broad 
claims about a widespread problem of frequent and “incoherent” judgments. These real world 
studies have shown that punitive awards are generally infrequent. When punitive awards are 
rendered, they most often occur in intentional tort cases involving financial matters. Generally, 
punitive awards are modest in comparison to compensatory awards. 
 One of the reasons that these studies may not have received more attention from judges, 
legal scholars and commentators is that they are usually presented in the form of rather austere 
aggregate statistics, often accompanied by regression analyses or other arcane, albeit important, 
methods of assessing data sets.  
Mary Rose and I described data from Florida state courts between 1989 and 1998 that 
attempted to put a more concrete face on real world punitive damage awards by breaking the data 
into categories, comparing ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages and describing the 
nature of “outlier awards.”28 Our data showed that the actual number of punitive damage awards in 
Florida from 1989 through 1998 averaged about 23 cases per year.29 Moreover, slightly over 23 
percent involved modest punitive awards against impaired drivers.30 The next biggest category 
involved claims of fraud and other financial losses (just over 17 percent) and the third largest 
number of cases involved claims of physical and sexual assaults (about 16 percent).31 Product 
liability cases accounted for only slightly over 7 percent of cases and a closer examination of these 
cases revealed that most involved asbestos claims from the early part of the 1990s decade.32 
Responding to the legal controversy involving the ratio between punitive and compensatory 
                                                 
28 Vidmar and Rose,  Punitive Damages by Juries In Florida: In Terrorem and In Reality, 38 HARVARD JOURNAL ON 
LEGISLATION, 487 (2001).  
29 Id. at 492. 
30 Id. at 495. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 496. 
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awards,33 we examined the data further to assess the ratio of punitive awards to compensatory 
awards by types of cases.34  These data are reproduced in Table 1.35  
                                                 
33 See note 26 supra. 
34 Vidmar and Rose, supra note 29 at 501. The ratios reported in this column are the medians of the individual ratios. 
35 Id. at 501, designated as Table 3 in the original article. Research currently in progress will expand this data set and 
further examine the relationship between punitive and compensatory damages in greater detail.  
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Table 1.  Distribution of median total and punitive awards and the median ratio of 
punitive to compensatory awards, by case type (1988 – 2000) 
 
 
Type of case 
 
N 
cases 
 
Median 
Total 
Award 
 
Median 
Punitive 
Award 
 
Pun: Comp 
Ratio 
(median) 
 
Motor vehicle accidents 63 $284,736 $21,579 0.1:1 
Fraud, contract violation, and 
other financial damage cases 
47 $392,158 $318,055 1.0:1 
Assaults  43 $221,461 $59,832 0.4:1 
Products liability 20 $2,245,635 $666,936 0.8:1 
Information violations (privacy, 
slander, defamation, libel) 
20 $191,264 $108,530 1.1:1 
False imprisonment/false arrest 20 $234,752 $139,814 0.4:1 
Premises liability 17 $933,660 $200,081 0.5:1 
Discrimination/ harassment 13 $1,344,841 $1,030,530 2.3:1 
Professional negligence 12 $3,078,133 $1,006,172 2.5:1 
Workplace injuries/ fa ilure to pay 
benefits 
11 $317,260 $71,820 0.5:1 
Other: Improper treatment of dead 
persons 
  4 $3,434,572 $3,052,075 6.3:1 
Overall 270 $612,028 $151,871 0.7:1 
Note: Awards adjusted to 1999 dollars.   
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Table 1 shows that the median ratios ranged from 0.1:1 in impaired driver accidents to 
 6.3:1 in four cases involving improper treatment of deceased persons. The median punitive 
damages ratio in products liability cases was 0.8:1. Considering all cases, the average punitive 
damages award was only 68 percent of the compensatory award.36   
Examination of the claims made by the plaintiffs in most of the cases led to the conclusion 
that there was a prima facie case for punitive damages.37 For instance, in one case the plaintiff 
alleged that a company, cited previous time for dumping toxic chemicals, dumped chemicals in a 
dumpster that killed two young boys.38 In another case the plaintiff alleged that the captain of a 
cargo ship ignored warnings about dangerous levels of carbon monoxide and failed to inform the 
Coastguard about the condition, killing one of the rescuers who had come to the aid of a 
crewman. 39 Other cases were similar. Businesses engaging in commonly accepted practices or 
those taking normal safety precautions were rarely assessed punitive damages.40  Moreover, when 
both a business and an individual were jointly named in a lawsuit, the business was often found 
liable for compensatory damages but in 36 percent of these cases only the individual defendant 
was assessed punitive damages, suggesting that the juries differentiated between behaviors of 
defendants  and were not necessarily anti-business. 
The use of the median statistic can obscure the presence of large awards, and indeed there 
were some very large awards in some cases. 41  Yet, a closer examination of the top twenty awards 
yielded interesting insights.  Six of these “mega” awards involved cases in which the defendants 
were not represented by a lawyer and a seventh case involved a company already in bankruptcy 
and facing criminal charges. Other awards were denied in post-trial review or subjected to 
remittitur, and at the time of the reports, still other cases had pending motions about the award.42 
Overall, at least half of the mega awards resulted in no payment to the plaintiff or a reduced 
payment.43  
                                                 
36 Id. at 503. 
37 Id. at 496-499.  
38 Perez v. William Recht Co., No.92-8983, 1995 WL 861061 ( Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept 28, 1995)  
39 Tabil v. Juno Marine Agency, Inc., No. 88-45327-CA-22, 1998 WL 355212 ( Fla Cir.Ct., Feb 23, 1998). 
40 Vidmar and Rose, supra note 29 at 499. 
41 In one instance the jury awarded $1 in compensatory damages and $14,000 in punitive damages, a 14,000:1 ratio of 
punitive to compensatory damages. As this example illustrates one or two aberrant cases can distort statistical means 
and standard deviations. There are statistical ways to control for such extreme values and these will be explored in 
future research with the data.  
42 Id. at 503-506. 
43 Id. at 506. 
 12
 
Other Real World Research Studies 
 While our Florida data present a detailed picture of only one state jurisdiction during a span 
of a dozen years, a substantial number of additional studies collected by various independent 
researchers in private and government institutions and in universities44 have produced findings 
generally consistent with the Florida data reported above.45 While it is not my purpose here to 
review this research in detail, a few examples are illustrative.  Michael Rustad studied twenty-five 
years of punitive damages in products liability cases.46 His findings indicated that punitive verdicts 
are rare, tend to be proportionate to the wrongdoing and tend to be based upon avoidable patterns 
of corporate recklessness.47  A U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics study indicated that in 1996 the 
median punitive damage award for all jury trial cases nationwide was $50,000.48  
The RAND Institute for Civil Justice studied punitive damages occurring in selected 
jurisdictions for a period extending from 1960 through 1994.49 Researchers in that organization 
concluded that punitive damages were awarded rarely, and mostly in business disputes and 
                                                 
44  Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 
IOWA L. REV.1 (1992); Rustad and Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: Targeting 
Amoral Corporations, Not “Moral Monsters ,” 47 RUTGERS L.REV. 975 (1995); Peterson, et al. Punitive Damages: 
Empirical Findings, Institute for Civil Justice. RAND Corporation (1987); Rustad and Koenig, Reconceptualizing 
Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not “Moral Monsters ,” 47 RUTGERS 
L.REV. 975 (1995); Rottman et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990's, 79 JUDICATURE 
223 (1996); C. DeFrances and M. Litras  Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 1996, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Bulletin, September, 1999; Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26  J. OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 623 (1997); Moller, Trends in Civil Jury Verdicts Since 1985, The Institute for Civil Justice, RAND 
Corporation (1996); Daniels and Martin, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995); Moller, Pace and Carroll, 
Punitive Damages In Financial Injury Jury Verdicts, 28 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 283 (1999); Eisenberg, La 
Fountain, Rottman, and Wells, Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 
743 (2002) ; Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 1998 WISC. L. REV.169 (1998); 44 
Karpoff and Lott, On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damage Awards, XLII JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 527 (1999); Rustad, Unravelling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WISCONSIN 
LAW REVIEW 15 (1998). 
45 One of these studies, by Karpoff and Lott, supra note 44, assessed the magnitude of punitive damages against the 
type of lawsuit and the defendant company, variables accounting for only between one and two percent of the variance 
(at 571), causing the authors to conclude that punitive awards are highly variable and unpredictable. However, there 
were only two variables and they were such gross measures that this conclusion cannot be taken seriously. On the 
other hand it is important also to note that these same authors compared punitive awards to compensatory awards; the 
punitive award was was positively and significantly related to the compensatory award (at 543). 
46 Michael Rustad,  supra note 44..   
47 For a review and summary of nine studies actual jury verdicts in punitive damages cases see, Thomas Koenig and 
Michael Rustad, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (2001) at 180-184..  
48 C. DeFrances and M. Litras  CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Bulletin, September, 1999.  
49 Peterson, et al. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, Institute for Civil Justice. RAND Corporation (1987). 
Moller, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985, The Institute for Civil Justice, RAND Corporation (1996). 
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intentional tort cases, and that, generally, the awards were modest in relation to compensatory 
damages. Another Institute For Civil Justice report covered the period 1985 to 1994 and involved 
15 state courts of general jurisdiction. 50 With respect to punitive damages, the report concluded: 
“[p]erhaps the most striking finding that emerges from the jury verdict data in this study is that 
punitive damages are awarded very rarely.”  The report also concluded: “The discussion about 
punitive damages focuses primarily on products liability, but in jurisdictions we examined, most 
punitive damages were awarded in intentional tort and business cases....” and “[i]n contrast, 
products liability was the underlying cause of action in only 4.4 percent of the punitive damage 
awards made.”  
Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin at the American Bar Foundation examined punitive 
damages from a number of locations around the United States over twenty-one years. While 
finding some variations across jurisdictions they concluded that juries did not routinely award 
punitive damages, and that median awards tended to be modest.51   
In 1998 Michael Rustad reviewed nine studies based on real world empirical data.52 He 
observed that there are many things that are unknown about punitive damages but concluded that 
Every empirical study of punitive damages demonstrates that there is no 
nationwide punitive damages crisis. The research shows that punitive 
damages cluster in business tort and intentional tort cases, not personal 
injury. The increase in punitive damages is largely confined to a few 
jurisdictions.53   
 
 Eisenberg et al. compared judge versus jury trial outcomes in 45 of the nation=s largest 
counties in 1996.77  After controlling for differences in the types of cases heard by each set of 
decision makers, those authors concluded that there was no substantial evidence that judges and 
juries differed ne ither in the rate at which they awarded punitive damages nor in the basic ratio of 
punitive to compensatory damages.  Jury trials did have a greater range of punitive damages for a 
given level of compensatory damages but in the end, those authors concluded, there were only a 
“trivially” few cases in which the jury award would have exceeded what a judge might have 
awarded.  
                                                 
50 Moller, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985, The Institute for Civil Justice, RAND Corporation (1996). 
51 Daniels and Martin, supra note 44 at 238-243. 
52 Rustad, Unravelling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 15 (1998).  
53 Id. at 69. 
77 Eisenberg, et al., supra note 44. 
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Some of the real world studies have also addressed the issue of  post-verdict adjustments of  
punitive awards.54 Generally, these studies found that very large verdicts were adjusted downward 
by trial or appellate judges or through settlements. Indeed, it is worthwhile noting that these 
findings are consistent with a study by one of the authors of Punitive Damages. Professor Viscusi 
concluded that in products liability cases involving punitive damages 
“plaintiffs received only 29% of the original punitive award.  Courts often 
reduce punitive damages on appeal, and defendants may negotiate a 
reduction in this amount in return for prompt payment of the damages 
amount.”55 
 
Contradicted Claims  
 The real world studies and the conclusions drawn by their respective authors have been 
widely available to researchers. Yet, while hardly acknowledging these adverse data, Punitive 
Damages makes the grand claim in Chapter 1: 
To our knowledge, there is not a single instance in which our results 
disagree with findings from other experiments conducted by independent 
groups of behavioral researchers or with any findings from the statistical 
analysis of actual trial verdicts.56 (italics added) 
  
In Chapter 12 summarizing the series of studies the claim is modified slightly: 
Support for the claim that dollar awards are erratic has accumulated in 
research based on analyses of archival award statistics demonstrating the 
unpredictability of jury punitive damages awards in actual courtrooms. Our 
reading of this controversial literature is that jury verdicts are highly 
variable for similar cases, especially across jurisdictions.57  
 
One study cited in Chapter 12 and discussed again in Chapter 13,58 was to an empirical 
study by Eisenberg et al.59 The abstract to that article reads, in part:  
                                                 
54 Peterson, et al. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, Institute for Civil Justice. RAND Corporation (1987); 
Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA 
L. REV.1 (1992); Rustad and Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: Targeting Amoral 
Corporations, Not “Moral Monsters,” 47 RUTGERS L.REV. 975 (1995);  See generally, Thomas Koenig, The Shadow 
Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements 1998 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 157, 202-207 (1998). 
55 W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1991) at 94. 
56  PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 20. 
57 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 213-214.  
58 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 245-248.  Chapter 13 also refers to an additional study: Jonathan Karpoff and John Lott, On 
the Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damage Awards, 42 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 527 (1999). 
That research attempted to explain the variation in punitive awards with two variables, the type of case and the size of 
the defendant company, finding little relationship with the size of the award. The research did not examine specific 
case facts such as the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct. It also attempted to comp are cases in which punitive 
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…this article shows a strong and statistically significant correlation between 
compensatory and punitive damages.  … In addition we find no evidence 
that punitive damages awards are more likely when individuals sue 
businesses than when individuals sue individuals. With respect to award 
frequency, juries rarely award punitive damages and appear to be especially 
reluctant to do so in the areas of law that have captured the most attention, 
products liability and medical malpractice. Punitive damages are most 
frequently awarded in business/contract cases and intentional tort cases. The 
frequency-of-award findings are consistent with all major studies of punitive 
damages.60  
 
While the authors of Punitive Damages are entitled to interpret studies differently than the 
original authors of these various real world studies, it is peculiar that they did not acknowledge the 
studies and give reasons why the findings should be interpreted differently. 61 
 
III. Methodological Issues in Simulation Research: 
Context for Interpreting the Experiments in Punitive Damages 
 
Real world data derived from archival analyses do not provide direct insights into jury 
decision-processes. They provide only the end results. Comparing the results with other variables 
allows us to make inferences about how jurors behave, but the inferences are indirect. One way to 
discover how juries decide punitive damages would be observations of juries as they deliberate, 
but with one notable exception this has not been allowed for legal policy reasons.62 Another way is 
to randomly assign some real world juries to deliberate under some instructions or conditions 
                                                                                                                                                                
“awards” were reflected in settlements, a dubious undertaking since the characteristics of settled cases are so different 
from cases that go to trial, see generally, Michael Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort 
litigation System –and Why Not?, 140 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1147 (1992); Vidmar N. Pap and 
Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us about Jury Behavior and the Tort System. 27 SUFFOLK 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1205 (1994/1996).   
59 Eisenberg et al., supra note 44. 
60 Id. at  623. 
61  Feigenson, supra note 21 at 250 and 255-6 also raises similar points about the failure of the authors of PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES to confront data bearing on actual jury verdict on punitive damages.  
62 See Diamond, Vidmar, Rose, Ellis and Murphy, Juror Discussions During Trials: Studying an Arizona              
Innovation, 45  ARIZONA LAW REVIEW 1 (2003); Diamond and Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden 
Evidence, 87 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1857 (2001). Systematic post-verdict  interviews with jurors is still another 
method, but it has problems involving the accuracy and reliability of juror recall, see Paula L. Hannaford et al., 
Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 359 (2000); Paula 
L. Hannaford-Agor et al.,  “Speaking Rights”: Evaluating Juror Discussions During Civil Trials , 85 JUDICATURE 237 
(2002). 
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while others deliberate under different conditions, but this too, usually conflicts with legal policy.63 
Even in the extremely rare instances in which juries deciding real cases have been studied, 
problems of differences of confounding variables within trials and between different trials remain. 
Although these confounds can be minimized through various statistical measures, an alternative 
way of gaining knowledge is through simulation research. 
Experimental simulations involving human behavior, including jury behavior, are widely 
used in the behavioral sciences and in other disciplines as well.  Punitive Damages is correct in its 
assertion that systematic experimentation is a “venerable and widely used method of scientific 
investigation,”64 and “used routinely in engineering, medical and behavioral research.”65 
Experimental methods allow causal inferences by controlling variables that are confounded in the 
real world.66  However, applying data from simulation studies to real world problems, particularly 
problems involving broad policy changes, presents complications that require a great deal of 
caution, including close attention to methodological details. Consider three important social 
science concepts: internal validity, external validity and ecological validity. 
Social scientists refer the extent to which extraneous variables are controlled as the 
problem of internal validity.67 The more extraneous variables are controlled the more likely that a 
relationship between one variable and another can be inferred to be causal. Experimental studies of 
jury simulations can control variables and thus have the potential to be high in internal validity. 
For example, if we are concerned about whether one  form of jury instruction is superior to others 
different instructions can be given to different sets of simulating jurors who hear the same 
summary of trial evidence; then the jurors’ comprehension under the differing instructions can be 
assessed. Because all of the trial evidence and the form and manner in which it is presented is 
exactly the same across trials, any differences between types of instructions can be assumed to be 
due to the instructions. Alternative explanations can be ruled out.  A causal link is established and 
                                                 
63 In the two Arizona jury studies, Diamond et al., supra note 62 and Hannaford et al. supra note 62  juries were  
randomly assigned to different sets of instruction conditions, but such experiments have been rare in jury research.  
64 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 18. 
65 Id. at 19.  
66  See William R. Shadish, Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL 
DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE (2002) at 33-102;  Elliot Aronson, Timothy Wilson and Marilynn 
Brewer, Experimentation in Social Psychology, in Daniel Gilbert, Susan Fiske and Gardner Lindzey, eds., THE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol I (1998), at 129-135; Marilyn Brewer, Research Design and Issues of 
Validity, in Harry T. Reiss and Charles M. Judd, eds., HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND 
PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY (2000) at Chapter 1 , pages 3-39.  
67 Brewer, supra note 66 at 4; Shadish et al., supra note 66 at 53-63. 
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we can say the experiment is high in internal validity. 68 But achieving high internal validity usually 
has costs. By controlling some variables the interplay of other variables as they occur in the real 
world and interact with one another is often altered.    
Thus, even if a causal link is established in a particular experiment, we can ask if the results 
are robust enough that they transcend the subject population or the particular trial evidence or the 
particular moment in time. If the above experiment on jury instructions used college students as 
jurors would we get the same results with a non-student group of jury-eligible voters? Would the 
results be the same using jury-eligible persons from Texas as opposed to jury-eligible persons from 
Massachusetts? Would they obtain if the case was changed, say, from a medical malpractice case 
to a case involving investment fraud? Would an experiment involving a criminal defendant 
identified as being from an Arab country yield different results if it was carried out prior to 
September 11, 2001 as opposed to after that date?69  To the extent that the results generalize across 
these various settings, the study may be seen to have external validity.70 
Concerns about external validity can be partially overcome when the simulation 
experiments are conducted in a variety of different settings or under different conditions showing a 
certain amount of consistency, or generalizability. This, in fact, is one of the claims made by the 
authors of Punitive Damages, namely that they have achieved “repeated replication of the research 
results across experimental tests within the research program, and from replication in independent 
research programs.”71 
But there is a third validity issue that is of concern. All simulation experiments, whether in 
the social, biological or physical sciences, are only analogues. They differ in the degree to which 
there is verisimilitude between the experimental context and the real world. Some jury 
experiments, for example, have present respondents with only a short one- or two-page description 
of trial evidence in order to assess the effects of a certain variable that was hypothesized to have an 
influence on jury decision-making. One such experiment presented groups of jurors and groups of 
judges with brief trial concerning a products liability case. It varied conditions bearing on 
inadmissible evidence in order to test whether judges were as susceptible to inadmissible evidence 
                                                 
68 Often the question is posed as to whether an plausible alternative hypothesis can explain the relationship between 
the variables. If not the study is said to be high in internal validity, see William Shadis h , Thomas Cook and Donald T. 
Campbell, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE , 53-64 (2002).    
69 For further discussion on this example, see Vidmar, When All of Us Are Victims: Juror Prejudice and “Terrorist” 
Trials, 78  CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 1143 (2003). 
70  Shadish et al., supra note 66 at 83-102. Brewer, supra note 66 at 10-12. 
71  PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 20. 
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as jurors.72  (They were !) Other experiments attempt to mimic the real world as closely as possible 
within certain constraints. Thus, one experiment exploring the effect of trial procedures on punitive 
damages created a trial script based on an actual trial that contained all the elements of the trial, 
including presentations by the plaintiff and defendant and instructions by the judge.73 Different 
versions of parts of the trial were created to test hypotheses about weak or moderately strong 
evidence favoring the plaintiff and about the effects of unitary or bifurcated trials.74 Professional 
actors played the roles of the lawyers and the judge in a courtroom and a two and one-half hour 
videotape trial was produced. Jury-eligible persons were recruited to serve as jurors. These 
simulating jurors were exposed to a form of voir dire, watched the trial and deliberated to a verdict. 
Although differences in the degree of verisimilitude was quite substantial, both experiments 
described above produced useful knowledge.  
Nevertheless, even the most complex simulation does not create all the conditions of the 
real world. Applying its results directly to policy must be treated with some caution, even if the 
findings are replicated in other experiments. Most social science researchers explicitly recognize 
this issue in their articles, the problem of ecological validity.   
As described by Professor Marilynn Brewer in a leading social psychology research 
manual:  
The question of whether an effect holds up across a wide variety of people 
or settings is somewhat different than asking whether the effect is 
representative of what happens in everyday life. This is the essence of 
ecological validity—whether an effect has been demonstrated to occur under 
conditions that are typical for the population at large.  
 
                                                 
72 Stephan Landsman and Richard Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on 
Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND THE LAW 113 (1994). 
73 Stephen Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The paradoxical Effects of Bifurcating Claims for 
Punitive Damages 1998 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 297, 309-314; Shari Diamond, et al., Juror Judgments About 
Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 301,303-
305 (1998). For other complex simulation experiment attempting to mimic real world trial conditions see: Irwin 
Horowitz and Kenneth Bordens, The Effects of Outlier Presence, Plaintiff Population Size, and Aggregation of 
Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury Decisions, 12 Law and Human Behavior 209 (1988) and Horowitz et al., Effects of 
Trial Complexity on Decision Making, 81 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 757 (1992).  
74  Despite its apparent relevance to experimental studies of punitive damages, the Landsman et al. study is not 
referenced in PUNITIVE DAMAGES. Some of the findings of that study might be interpreted as supporting the Exxon 
research, but many  findings do not. For instance, Dimond et al., supra note 73 at 316, found that that the standard 
deviations of damages awards by the deliberating juries to be much smaller than those of  pre-deliberation awards of 
the individual jurors.  In comparing any of the experiments reported in PUNITIVE DAMAGES to the Landsman study 
with regard to an attempt to create real world trial conditions PUNITIVE DAMAGES does not fare well.  
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Representativeness is not the same as robustness. Generalizability in the 
robustness sense asks whether an effect can occur across different settings 
and people; ecological validity asks whether it [a finding or set of findings] 
does occur in the world as it is.75  
 
It is for this reason that writings about the theory of social psychology emphasize that 
experimentally derived data, regardless of how many experiments are conducted, must be checked 
against the real world, especially when policy recommendations are made from the research. 76 
Thus, to quote Brewer again:  
When the research is essentially descriptive, ecological validity may be 
essential. When the purpose is utilitarian, robustness of an effect is 
particularly critical. The fragility and non-generalizability of a finding may 
be a fatal flaw if one’s goal is to designing an intervention to solve some 
applied problem. 77  
 
Lawyers will quickly see that ecological validity has a close similarity to the relevancy 
requirement of F.R.E. 702, as articulated in the Daubert  cases.78  Particularly germane is the 
second prong of Rule 702, namely the degree of “fit” between scientific evidence and the 
contested issues in the case.79 No matter how rigorous the methodology and number of replications 
(producing internal validity and external validity) the research must have “fit” to the problem at 
hand. In the remand decision, commonly called Daubert II, evidence derived from structure 
activity, in vitro and in vivo experiments was judged to not have the same “fit” in proving 
                                                 
75 Brewer , supra note 66 at 12. Some research authorities prefer to treat ecological validity , as Brewer and I use it 
here, as an aspect of  external validity, see William Shadish, Thomas Cook and Donald Campbell, EXPERIMENTAL AND 
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE, 37-39(2002) but the ecological validity is a 
better concept for conveying application of research in policy contexts.  
76 Indeed, one of the authors of PUNITIVE DAMAGES has previously acknowledged this important matter: “Given a 
specific interpretation of  the [or a] theory, its consequences can be treated as predictions to be compared with data 
from the real world to determine the degree of correspondence between the theory and the world.” Reid Hastie and 
Gerald Stasser, Computer Simulation Methods for Social Psychology at 85 in Harry T. Reiss and Charles M. Judd, 
eds., HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY (2000). The Hastie and Stasser 
discussion references a classic book, Morton Deutch and Robert Krauss, THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY,6-13 and 
215-216 (1965).    
77 Brewer supra note 66 at 12-13; see also Aronson et al. , supra note 66 at 134-35: “…the interplay between 
laboratory and field research is also critical to the development of an effective and applied social psychology. Basic 
process-oriented experimental research may isolate important causal processes; however, convincing demonstrations 
that those processes operate in applied settings are essential before theory can be converted into practice  
78 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 43 F. 3d 
1311 (1995). The Daubert decisions are addressed to factual proof rather than  policy issues but the analogy is 
nevertheless close.   
79 Daubert (1993) at 591-92; Daubert (1995) at 1315.  
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Bendectin was a teratogen as epidemiological studies showing no established relationship with 
birth defects in humans.80  
The problem of the ecological validity of jury experiments has received considerable 
attention in the research literature81 and is not settled, but, at minimum, prudence should be 
exercised in recommending major policy changes bearing on juries from simulation experiments, 
especially when they are at variance with real world data.  
  
IV. The Experiments on Punitive Damages: 
Major Problems of Ecological and Internal Validity 
 
Although they ignore most real world data in deference to their experiments, the authors of 
Punitive Damages concede some problems of generalizability, acknowledging that simulation 
experiments cannot “replicate the sense of gravity and importance of a courtroom decision.”82  
They report that every effort was made to ensure realism: e.g. “Most of the experimental 
cases were based on real decided cases; jury instructions were taken directly from actual trials; and 
only citizens eligible to serve on real juries were sampled as research participants.”83  
In consequence, Punitive Damages addresses the problem of generalizing to the real world 
in the following summary:  
An obviously central question is whether our results are reflected in 
behavior in the real world. An initial reason to believe that they are is that 
many of the tasks were quite realistic. As compared with real jurors, our 
mock jurors’ job was simplified, but it incorporated the basic responsibilities 
of the real world jurors. A second reason comes from the repeated 
replication of research results across experimental tests within the research 
program, and from replications in independent research programs.84     
 
It is important to look more closely at those experiments. A closer look reveals severe 
limitations on this claim. By first asking about ecological validity more than a few red flags about 
                                                 
80 In Daubert (1995)at 962 the epidemiological data were considered to have a better fit than data derived well-
constructed laboratory research.  See Joseph Sanders, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 
(1998) at Chapter 7, 175-192  for additional discussion.  
81  See  Shari Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations,  21 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 561 
(1997); Brian Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still out? 23 LAW AND HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 75 561 (1999). 
82 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 20. 
83 Id. at 19. 
84 Id. at 19-20.  
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making major policy recommendations from their findings appear. Additionally, the scrutiny of the 
experimental materials for ecological validity reveals problems that bear on internal validity and in 
one instance raises questions about the correspondence of findings across settings, that is external 
validity.  
    
Real World Juries 
In the introduction to Punitive Damages Professor George Priest reviews the basic 
procedural context in which real world juries decide punitive damages.85 This context includes the 
voir dire process, opening statements, a trial involving evidence about liability and compensatory 
damages; and a decision about whether punitive damages are warranted. If punitive damages are 
deemed to be warranted, in a separate phase of the trial the jury hears evidence and arguments 
about the degree of misbehavior of the defendant and any remorse or other mitigating factors on 
the part of the defendant.86  Finally, the jury receives instructions from the judge about how to 
decide those damages. Priest mentions in passing that it is also “increasingly common” for the 
plaintiff’s lawyer to make reference to the defendant’s wealth “though only in general terms.”87 
While this is a reasonable description of the basic components of the trial process, 
Professor Priest underplays the substance of what the jury hears at trial. Over a period of days or 
weeks the jury will be exposed to many documents and witnesses. This evidence will bear not only 
on the liability and compensatory damages but also on the behavior of the plaintiff and defendant. 
Jurors may see documents that reflect calculated behavior and reckless greed on the part of a 
defendant  individual or organization, such as incriminating memoranda outlining deception or 
reckless behavior in the face of clear warnings. They may hear testimony from civilian or expert 
witnesses who corroborate the documents or supply additional details bearing on more than just 
                                                 
85 Priest in PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 6-14.  
86 Statues and case law vary from state to state as to a separate, or bi-furcated, trial. For example, in California, bi-
furcation is mandatory on application of defendant. Jury will first determine liability/amount of compensatory 
damages & liability for punitive damages. Second phase reserved for determination of amount of punitive damages, 
which may not be mentioned during first phase. § 3295(d). In Florida bi-furcation is mandated on timely motion. At 
the first  stage, the  jury determines liability and the amount of compensatory damages and liability for punitive 
damages. If the jury finds  punitives are warranted, it determines the amount of punishment, see W.R. Grace & Co.-
Conn. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 506 (Fla. 1994).  By contrast Alabama has a single stage trial; see Life Ins. Co. of 
Ga. v. Johnson, 701 So.2d 24, 532 (Ala. 1997), overruling in part 684 So.2d. 685 (Ala. 1996).  In Arizona bi-furcation 
is not mandated. The court may order a separate trial of any claim or issue in furtherance of convenience or to avoid 
prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 42(b).  
 
87 Priest, PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 13. 
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careless malfeasance. The jurors may hear first hand about the impact of this behavior on the 
victims. They may hear testimony bearing negatively on the credibility of plaintiff and defense 
witnesses or even see witnesses for either side exposed as liars during cross-examination. Jurors 
may also hear about the behavior of the defendant in previous incidents, in both the liability-
compensatory phase and punitive phase of the trial. In the punitive phase they likely will hear 
arguments from defense counsel about the reasonableness of the defendant’s behavior given what 
was known beforehand or about mitigating circumstances.88 The jurors may hear expert evidence 
from both sides about the ability of the defendant to bear the economic burden of a punitive 
damage award. The defense may offer their own figures to rebut the plaintiff’s suggested amount 
of punitive damages during final arguments, thus providing a counter-anchor to the plaintiff’s ad 
damnum. The jury will be instructed to weigh all of this evidence with a plethora of knowledge 
gained during the first phase of the trial. Finally, the jurors, ranging between six and twelve in 
number, will be required to deliberate on the issues to reach a unanimous (or super-majority) 
verdict.  
The above supplement to Professor Priest’s summary thus reminds us that real world jurors 
do not begin the punitive phase of the trial with a blank slate about misbehavior. Nor does the 
punitive phase necessarily involve only the plaintiff presenting evidence and arguments; the 
defendant is allowed to present evidence and arguments. In short Priest’s  summary of the punitive 
damages process underplays the knowledge and education that the jury obtains during the trial.  
When the jury receives its instructions from the judge on how to decide punitive damages it 
has a great deal of background information against which to interpret those instructions and reach a 
verdict. In Florida, for example, the jury is given instructions that it needs “clear and convincing 
evidence” that the conduct was so gross or flagrant as to show reckless disregard of human life or 
the rights of others or intentional misconduct or gross negligence to decide if punitive damages 
should be awarded against the defendant. In the instance of multiple defendants the jury is told that 
it may decide punitive damages are warranted against one defendant and not others or against more 
than one defendant.89 In deciding the amount of punitive damages the jury is instructed to consider 
the “nature, extent, and degree of misconduct and related circumstances;” “each defendant’s 
                                                 
88 Richard Lempert also makes this point in a critique of one of the Exxon studies, see Richard Lempert, Juries, 
Hindsight Bias, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL LAW 
REVIEW 867, 877 (1999). 
89 The Florida Bar, STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, 2001 edition updated through 2002 , Punitive 
Damages , Westlaw JICV FL CLE PD ,   
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financial resources”90 and “any other circumstances which may affect the amount of punitive 
damages.”91  The jury is also told that any disputed factual issues bearing on the amount to be 
assessed as punishment and deterrence to others should be determined by the greater weight of the 
evidence.92  
Since the authors of Punitive Damages make such broad policy recommendations we need 
to keep these real world facts firmly in mind and compare them to the experiments reported in 
Punitive Damages and prior published articles that  describe the methodology of the experiments 
in greater detail than in the book. We need to ask questions about the degree to which the 
simulation experiments accurately mimicked the real world trial process and the degree to which 
the presentation of “trial” evidence and instructions was balanced. The first question speaks to 
ecological validity and the second speaks, in some important instances, to internal validity. Along 
the way some other important questions about validity can be raised. 
 
From Outrage to Erratic Dollars in Eight-Sentence, Truncated “Trials”   
Chapter 2 of Punitive Damages reports an experiment that attempted to study jurors’ ability 
to decide the dollar amounts of damages. The authors of that chapter conclude that the experiment 
demonstrates that jurors are erratic in translating moral judgments about defendant behavior into 
dollar awards.93  
Chapter 2 is based on a previously published law review article.94 That article provides 
greater detail about the method and procedure of the experiment.  The experiment was conducted 
in a “downtown motel” and “[m]ost [of the 899 “jury-eligible”] respondents completed their task 
in thirty to forty-five minutes. Each respondent first received three pages of general instructions on 
the law. Then, each respondent answered questions about a number of scenarios, ranging from 
“about one” to five, concerning an injury suffered by a plaintiff. The scenarios reported that 
compensatory damages had already been awarded. The ten personal injury scenarios used in the 
                                                 
90 To be used only when financial resources are introduced , id., note 3 re subparagraph (2) in PD 2nd 
91 Id..  
92 Id.  
93 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 42. 
94  Sunstein , et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE LAW 
JOURNAL  2071 (1998).  
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experiment ranged between six and ten sentences in length, with a median length of eight 
sentences.95  
After reading each scenario each mock juror was asked to respond to two six-point 
“bounded” rating scales measuring how much the defendant should be punished. The first scale 
was worded as follows: “ Which of the following best expresses your opinion of the defendant’s 
action?” and the participants were provided with a six-point scale anchored at one end by 
“Completely Acceptable” and at the other by “Outrageous.” The second question was worded as 
follows: “In addition to paying compensatory damages, how much should the defendant be 
punished? Please express your opinion of the appropriate level of punishment.” The question was 
accompanied by a six-point scale anchored on the respective ends by “No Punishment” and 
“Extremely Severe Punishment.” The third question was an “open-ended” scale that asked, “In 
addition to paying compensatory damages, what amount of punitive damages (if any) should the 
defendant be required to pay as punishment and to deter the defendant and others from similar 
actions in the future? Please write your answer in the blank below.”96   
The respondents in the experiment did not have the rich evidential context of a real trial, 
had not decided upon liability for either compensatory damages nor punitive damages, did not 
have the benefit of arguments from plaintiff and defense counsel and did not have the advantage of 
testing their personal views against the views of others in a process of deliberation. 
In addition to the paucity of information provided to the respondents, a second question 
arises about the scales. Do real juries make judgments about the appropriate level of punishment 
based on two questions that assess moral outrage on six-point scales? To what extent would those 
scale responses assess the egregiousness of the defendant’s behavior? Rating scales are commonly 
used in psychological research, but they have limitations and the best approach is to follow them 
with open-ended questions asking respondents to explain their reaction in their own words.97 
Would the simulating jurors have responded differently if, in addition, they had been asked to state 
their reasoning? Is it logical to compare responses on those bounded scales with the open-ended 
dollar scale?  To be sure, as Punitive Damages points out, real world verdicts on punitives are 
made on open-ended scales, but real world juries do not assess moral reprehensibility on six-point 
                                                 
95 Id. at 2147-2152. 
96 Id at 2152-2153. 
97 See Shari Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in Federal Judicial Center, REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, 2ND ED (2000) at 251-260. 
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bounded scales and without open-ended discussion about the reprehensibility of the behavior or the 
specific or general deterrence that might be accomplished by an award of punitive damages. These 
considerations place limitations on the ability of the  experimental findings to tell us about the real 
world.  
This experiment needs to be evaluated along with a companion experiment reported in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Deliberating About Dollars and Polarization Shifts in One-page, Plaintiff-biased  “Trials”  
Chapter 3 reports, in the authors’ words, the “results of a massive study of decisions by 
mock jurors”98 Simulating jurors were presented with a summary of trial evidence and assigned to 
groups to deliberate on a punitive damages verdict. Most of the groups followed a simple majority 
rule in reaching their decision. More important, in comparison to the median of individual pre-
deliberation judgments, dollar awards increased after group deliberation. Fully 27 percent of 
groups awarded dollar amounts that were as high or higher than the highest pre-deliberation 
judgment of any juror and the awards were less consistent and predictable than the mean or median 
amount awarded by the individual jurors. The authors of the experiment concluded that their 
findings are consistent with the “polarization shift” that has long been demonstrated in social 
psychology experiments whereby group discussion shifts pre-deliberation judgments toward 
extreme ends of psychometric scales.99      
Chapter 3 is also based on a previously published article that provides greater information 
about the experiment’s methodology.  100  In both the chapter and the article the authors make 
prominent the fact that that the study involved over 3000 jury-eligible respondents, and over 500 
six-person deliberating juries. The authors further report that the individual jurors viewed a “video-
taped narration” of one of a number of personal injury trials101 read by a professional actor, 
accompanied with a written script of the narration so that they could follow along. Then, 
approximately half of the subjects were asked to make a personal judgment on an eight-point scale 
                                                 
98  PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 43. 
99 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 31-32, 57-60, 61.     
100 Schkade, Sunstein and Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 
1139 (2000). 
101 Fifteen “trial” scenarios, based on real cases were used in the research, see PUNITIVE DAMAGES, at 47.  
 26
(a “bounded” scale102) of the degree to which the defendant should be punished103 while the 
remainder of the respondents were asked instead to assess on an “open-ended scale”104 an amount 
of damages that the defendant should be required to pay. 105  
Next, the respondents were assigned to six-person groups and asked to reach a unanimous 
decision on the judgment they had just made individually, that is, either on the eight-point scale or 
the open-ended scale involving dollars. Next, they were handed a new form asking them to make 
an individual personal judgment on the other scale; that is, those who had received the bounded 
scale now responded to the open-ended scale and those who had responded to the open-ended scale 
now responded to the bounded scale. Finally, the respondents were again assigned to six-person 
groups and asked to deliberate to a unanimous decision. During deliberations they were required to 
reach their decision in thirty minutes.  A total of 91 percent reached a unanimous decision on the 
punishment rating and 82 percent reached a unanimous decision on the open-ended dollar award 
judgment.106  
 Let me be very clear here. The experiment used what is called a “within 
participants” design.107 The procedure of having some subjects respond to one order of questions 
while another group of subjects responds in another order is known as counter-balancing for order 
effects and is an appropriate way of attempting to control biases that may result from making 
decisions in one order versus another and is used to attempt to increase internal validity of an 
experiment or survey. 108  “Within participants” experimental designs are commonly used in social 
psychology, but they are subject to problems bearing on internal as well as ecological validity. The 
internal validity problem is that by being required to make multiple decisions respondents may 
answer differently than if they were required to only make one decision. 109 As regards the problem 
of ecological validity, the essential point is that the conditions of the experiment do not mimic the 
conditions that lead to a single trial verdict on punitive damages that real world juries make.  
                                                 
102  See, Shari Diamond, supra note 97 at 229,251-264 (2000) for a discussion of closed and open-ended scales that are 
comparable to the terminology  of “bounded” and “open-ended”  scales.    
103 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 45.  
104 Diamond, supra note 97. 
105PUNITIVE DAMAGES at  45. 
106 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 46. 
107 Brewer , supra note 66 at 22-23.Shadish et al , supra note 66 at 109.  
108  See, Shadish et al., supra note 66at 115; Charles Judd, et al. RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS, 6th Ed. 
(1991) at 92-98. There are other reasons for using “within participants” designs that need not be addressed in this 
review.  
109 See Brewer, supra note 66 at 22-23. The problem involves arcana of experimental procedure that are beyond the 
scope of this article but the reader is encouraged to refer to Brewer on this issue. 
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Neither the book chapter nor the article explicitly reports the length of the trial narration, 
but the appendix in the original article reports what can be assumed was a typical “trial” 
narration. 110 It consisted of one page containing five short paragraphs, a combined total of thirteen 
sentences, about a products liability case. The first two paragraphs described the facts of the case: 
a child ingested medicine allegedly from a childproof safety cap and permanently weakened her 
respiratory system. In one sentence the subjects were told that the trial jury ordered the 
manufacturer to pay $200,000 in compensatory damages. Another paragraph consisting of five 
sentences laid out the evidence about the manufacturer’s malfeasance. A two-sentence paragraph 
summarized the closing arguments by plaintiffs’ counsel and another two-sentence paragraph 
summarized the defendant’s closing arguments.  
More than the obvious brevity of the stimulus “trial” deserves comment. The facts of the 
case are all biased in the plaintiff’s favor: the parents of the child were cautious; the overdose 
severely injured the child; the defendant’s childproof caps had a high failure rate and an internal 
memo not only downplayed the risks but said that the consequences of this misbehavior were 
trivial; there was a prior warning from the FDA. 111 The plaintiff’s closing emphasized these 
facts.112 The two sentences relaying the final arguments of the defendant in the scenario said that 
the caps were generally effective and asserted that the FDA warning was “only communicated to 
them verbally.”113 In total, of the thirteen sentences comprising all of the facts and arguments in 
the trial, only two presented the defendant’s position, a plaintiff to defendant ratio of 5.5:1.114   
Do real juries have such minimal facts and arguments upon which to make their judgments 
and in such a biased presentation?  Are they told that another trial jury decided compensatory 
damages were warranted?115 
Similar to the question raised about the experiment in Chapter 2 we need to ask: Do real 
juries make judgments about the appropriate level of punishment based on a simple instruction 
asking,  “How much should the defendant be punished because of their actions and to deter the 
                                                 
110 Schkade et al., supra note 100 at 1174. 
111 Id.  at 1174. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. 
114 Sentences favoring the plaintiff also included some long compound sentences so this is a conservative estimate of 
the plaintiff to defense ratio. 
115 Obviously in some rare instances a different jury may be asked to decide only the punitive damages portion of the 
trial as when a defendant concedes liability and compensatory damages but contests the punitive damages or as when a 
punitive damages verdict is retried after a legal judgment vacating the first verdict, but these are exceptions. 
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defendant and others from similar action in the future?” by responding to an eight-point scale 
anchored at one end by “None” and at the other by “Extremely Severe”? Is it reasonable to 
compare responses on that bounded scale with the open-ended scale dollar scale?   To what extent 
would that scale response, first individually and then through deliberation, affect responses to later 
dollar amounts compared to the discussion that real jurors might have about the egregiousness of 
the defendant’s behavior in their deliberations? As described above, some of the subjects were first 
directed to award an amount of damages without first giving considered attention to the 
egregiousness of the defendant’s behavior. But does that happen in real juries, especially under 
such minimal fact and argument conditions?  
There is more. The authors of the research found that group deliberation among the 
simulating jurors tended to enhance the size of  awards preferred by the individual jurors in the 
half hour allowed before deliberations were terminated. This led to the following conclusion: 
We have found that…deliberation makes low-punishment judgments 
decrease and high-punishment judgments increase. It also makes –and this is 
our most important finding –dollar awards generally increase, while making 
high-dollar awards substantially increase, in a general severity shift.116   
 
In the discussion of these findings 117 the authors correctly report the extensive literature on 
the “polarization shift” that has shown that such shifts frequently occur in a variety of settings 118 
and that the phenomenon is likely to occur under two conditions: when the arguments of the 
various group members tend to be in the same direction and when they adjust their views to 
conform with a perceived social consensus.119  
But now consider that, as described above, the facts and arguments in the thirteen- sentence 
trial summary were overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff. Under such conditions we can 
reasonably expect that most arguments and opinions generated by the simulating jurors would tilt 
toward the plaintiff and against the defendant. Putting it bluntly, the experiment did not provide a 
fair and balanced presentation of evidence.120 A more balanced presentation might well have 
                                                 
116 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 61. 
117  PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 57 but reported in considerably more detail in the original article: see Schkade,et al supra 
note 100. 
118 See, e.g. David Myers and Helmut Lamm, The Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 
602 (1976) or the review of the polarization literature in Schkade et al. at ??? 
119 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 58; Schkade et al, supra note 100. 
120 The importance of a fair and balanced presentation has been emphasized by Professor Hastie in an article 
discussing civil jury decision making. See Reid Hastie , The Role of “ Stories” in Civil Jury Judgments, 32 
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obtained either no shift or more shifts toward lesser amounts of damages because the simulating 
jurors would have been able to consider off-setting arguments favoring the defendant.121    
In summary, the gulf between the experimental simulation and the real world was wide, an 
ecological validity problem. In addition the trial summary presented to the simulating jurors 
contained no evidence favoring the defense. The imbalance in information provided to the 
simulating jurors involves a problem of internal validity because it does not allow us to rule out a 
                                                                                                                                                                
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM 227 (1999).  Reviewing research on the story model the author 
referred to findings from experiments conducted on criminal jury decision making as follows: 
For example, many criminal cases involve the presentation of only one story, by the prosecution, while the 
defense tactic is to ‘raise reasonable doubts’ by attacking the plausibility of that story. In these one-sided 
cases, jurors construct only one story, and confidence in the verdict is determined by coherence and fit of the 
single story to the verdict category. In this situation, a weak defense story is worse than no story at all; in fact, 
a weak prosecution story is bolstered and more guilty verdicts  are rendered when a weak defense story is 
presented versus no defense story at all. (at 232, footnotes omitted from quotation.)     
121 Strikingly, Professor Michael Saks, one of the authors of the Landsman et al. study of punitive damages, supra note 
_, suggests that data from that study seems consistent with my hypothesis on this matter. The experiment contained 
two versions of evidence, one of which involved weak evidence and the other moderate evidence supporting the 
plaintiff’s position on liability. In a personal communication by email on February 18, 2004 Saks offered the following 
comments about the Landsman et al. experiment in response to my hypothesis: 
 
The two levels of evidence strength for compensatory liability were pretested to be weak and moderate. In the 
moderate strength case, the plaintiff had a good bit of exposure to the defendant's products and smoked barely 
at all. In the weak case, the plaintiff had less verifiable exposure to the defendant's products and was a smoker 
(so the defendant's compensatory liability was less clear). The evidence on punitive liability was identical in 
all conditions. (Our "beryllium" case was modeled after asbestos: the defendants clearly knew and actively 
concealed the fatal harm of their product.)  
 
To the jurors' credit, the strength of the compensatory liability case had no effect on either the likelihood of 
finding punitive liability (see Table 6) or the amount of punitive damages awarded (see Table 7). As the 
compensatory liability of the defendant became more clear, they did not become more likely to find punitive 
liability or to award more in punitive damages. 
 
By comparing the damages amounts for certain conditions in Tables 7 and 8, one can see that it is not 
apparent that the "amplification" effect hypothesized by Sunstein et al. occurred. That conclusion is even 
more clear from looking at the "expected awards" in the decision trees for individual jurors versus 
deliberating juries in Figures 1 and 2 at the very end of the article. (Focusing on unitary trials, juries can be 
expected to award less in damages than nondeliberating individual jurors.) 
 
In addition consider an experiment by Martin Kaplan and Charles Miller, Judgments and Group Discussion: 
Effect of Presentation and Memory Factors on Polarization, 40 SOCIOMETRY 337 (1997). Some simulating juries 
listened to a tape-recording of facts incriminating a criminal defendant while others heard exonerating facts. Some 
jurors heard the facts in the same order (homogeneous order) and others heard them in a different order (heterogeneous 
order). The experiment found that, as hypothesized, a greater number of facts were remembered and shared by the 
juries under the heterogeneous compared to the homogeneous conditions. Moreover, in the exonerating condition there 
were group polarization shifts away from a guilt decision and in the incriminating conditions group discussion 
produced polarization shifts toward guilt. Although conducted in the context of a criminal trial the polarization shifts  
in this experiment are consistent with my suggestion that a more balanced presentation of facts or facts tending to 
favor the defendant in the Chapter 4 experiments would have produced no shifts or shifts away from larger punitive 
awards.    
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plausible alternative causal explanation of the results, namely that rather than a bias on the part of 
the jurors the polarization shift was caused by the imbalance of information overwhelmingly 
favoring the plaintiff. Viewed from this perspective, generalizations about the effect of jury 
deliberations on deciding dollars are hazardous.122  The conclusions of “higher than expected” and 
“greater than appropriate” post-deliberation awards in the study may well be a result of the atypical 
conditions and biased presentation under which the subjects operated, not withstanding the fact 
that the experiment contained over 3000 subjects.  
 
The Ad Damnum, Simulated Anchoring Effects and AWOL Defense Lawyers  
Chapter 4 of Punitive Damages presents two experiments purporting to assess the impact of 
the plaintiff’s ad damnum on punitive awards.123 The experiments were designed to test the 
hypothesis that the unbounded task of making dollar awards was likely subject to psychological 
anchoring produced by the plaintiff’s ad damnum.124 Chapter 4 concludes that there was a large 
effect of the size of the plaintiff’s reward request;  the more that was requested the more that was 
awarded.125  
Once again consider the methodology of the experiments.126 The simulating jurors were 
told that liability for the accident (an environmental spill of a toxic chemical) had been established 
in a prior legal proceeding and the defendant had paid $24.5 million in compensatory damages and 
fines. They were further told that the proceeding had determined that the company’s actions 
                                                 
122 Although I focus here on the polarization shift, Wissler, Saks and Hart, Decisionmaking about General Damages: A 
Comparison of Jurors Judges and Lawyers, 98 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 751, 802, note 147, point out that the claim of 
greater variability made by Sunstein et al. confuses the polarization phenomenon with the mass of cases dealing with 
punitive damages.  
123 Hastie, Schkadie and Payne, Do Plaintiffs’ Requests and Plaintiffs Identities Matter?, Chapter 4 of PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES. The chapter also investigates whether the residence of plaintiffs and defendants (a local entity or out-of-
state) would have an effect on awards. Statistical analyses produced equivocal results regarding residence location and 
will be ignored here. 
124 Chapter 4 also reports that the first of  the experiments also  attempted to assess whether  out-of-state defendants, as 
opposed to local defendants are treated more harshly.  I do not deal further with this part of the experiment except to 
note that in summarizing their findings  the authors,  asserted , id.at 73,  that that  “…punitive damages amounts were 
influenced by the plaintiff’s location,”  and followed followed  immediately with a contradictory  sentence reporting 
that “…we did not find statistically reliable effects due to defendant location.”  Statistically, it is improper to make a 
claim of a finding when the statistical tests do not support the hypothesis. Sometimes authors report a “trend” toward a 
certain hypothesis when the data are in the predicted direction of a hypothesis , but no qualification exis ts in the 
authors’ summary of findings. 
125 Id.at 73. 
126 Chapter 4 is based on Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s Requests and 
Plaintiff’s Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 445 (1999). 
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constituted reckless conduct and that punitive damages were warranted.127 They then viewed a 
videotaped narration, accompanied by a written summary and instructions. The presentation lasted 
35 minutes.128  The award-anchor conditions were created by varying the plaintiff’s closing 
argument, ranging from low to high amounts of suggested damages.129 Aside from the artificiality 
of not being involved in the liability and compensatory stages of the trial or having the advantages 
of deliberation, the subjects heard not a word from the defense side about why the punitive 
damages should not be so high, nor were they provided with a defense counter-anchor or expert 
evidence. (If the case had been a real trial it would appear that the defendant corporation  had solid 
grounds to sue its counsel for legal malpractice.)  In short, compared to real trials, the experiment 
presented only the plaintiff’s side of the argument.  
Punitive Damages’ assertion that psychological anchoring has been demonstrated in many 
experiments in the field of psychology130 is only partly accurate, especially when other   
experiments involving simulating jurors deciding compensatory awards are considered.  This is an 
important matter because Professor Sharkey, critical of other parts of Punitive Damages, has taken 
the anchoring effect at face value, concluding, that  “[behavioral research has demonstrated that 
the anchors selected have a disproportionate influence on the outcome of the decision”131 and, 
further, that “Sunstein et al. demonstrate that anchoring effects wreak havoc in the punitive 
damages realm.”132 Other law-trained scholars may also accept this conclusion. It is misleading. 
Anchor effects are far more complicated than the impression one obtains  from reading 
Chapter 4, especially when it comes to experimental studies of jury decision-making. Consider an 
experiment by Saks et al. 133  In one condition simulating jurors were provided both a low and a 
high award amount as anchors. The size of compensatory awards did not differ from a condition 
providing no anchors, but the variability of the awards was reduced.  Marti and Wissler followed 
                                                 
127 Id. at 65. 
128 Id. at 65-66, . 
129 Id. at 66 and 71. 
130 The authors, at 63, note 4, cite a review by Payne, Behavioral Decision Research; An Overview, in Michael 
Birnbaum et al.,  MEASUREMENT , JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (1998) as the basis for their rationale, along with 
a study by Bornstein and Chapman, The More you Ask For, the More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 
10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 519 (1996). Anchoring effects have been demonstrated in many settings, see, 
e.g. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty : Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 
(1974); Jackowitz and Kahnenman, Measures of Anchoring in Estimation Tasks, 21 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 1161 (1995).  
131 Sharkey, supra note 17 at 408 (footnote omitted). 
132 Id. 
133 Michael Saks et al.  Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 243 (1997). 
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up on this finding in an experiment that varied the amounts that both the plaintiff and the defense 
suggested for pain and suffering. 134 The size of the awards and the variability of those awards was 
influenced by both the plaintiff request and the defense request.135  
Professors Edie Greene and Brian Bornstein’s book, Determining Damages, devoted to 
experimental studies of how juries decide damages, thoroughly reviewed anchoring research as it 
relates to jury decisions.136 Their review considered simulation studies in which the defense 
offered a counter- figure to that of the plaintiff, in which expert economic evidence was introduced, 
and in which the simulating jurors deliberated. The findings showed that while simulating jurors 
were influenced by anchors,137the effects were much more nuanced than the Punitive Damages 
experiments and their authors suggest: to wit, defense counter- figures had moderating effects. In 
an experiment involving deliberations Greene and Bornstein concluded that “[a]pparently jury 
awards may be reduced when the defense presents a counter-offer, at least when that amount is 
offered by an expert.”138 In other words anchoring effects change when defense evidence and 
arguments are introduced. To repeat, such counter-anchors were absent from the Punitive 
Damages experiment.  
Thus, the simulation studies reported in Chapter 4 not only lack ecological validity, by 
among other things, failing to create conditions of evidence and counter-proposals by defendants, 
but they also lack external validity when compared to other experimental studies of jury award 
behavior. In addition the fact that the materials provided the respondents were heavily weighted in 
favor of the plaintiff, similar to the “Deciding Dollars” experiment in Chapter 3, raises problems of 
internal validity. 
 In an article published in the Stanford Law Review subsequent to Punitive Damages 
Sunstein, Kahneman, Schkade and Ritov acknowledged  that  “… judgment shifts are easy to 
generate in experimental settings”139(italics added.) Yes, and perhaps we may conclude from 
                                                 
134 Mollie Martie and Roselle Wissler, Be Careful What you Ask For: The Effects of Anchors on Personal Injury 
Damages Awards, 6 JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: APPLIED 91 (2000). 
135 Id. Award size and variability increased with the amount requested by the plaintiff, except when the amount 
suggested was extreme, in which event the amount decreased. The defense suggestion had a mirror effect: Award size 
and variability decreased in response to a defense rebuttal, except when the amount suggested was very low, in which 
case awards increased. 
136 Edith Greene and Brian Bornstein, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS (2002) at 150-
156.   
137 Id. at 155, 156 
138 Id. at 155. 
139 Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54  STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1153,1203 (2002). 
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Chapter 4 that plaintiff anchors do produce judgment shifts when experiments provide only one 
side of the evidence and arguments. But real juries operate from a very different context than that 
provided in the experiments reported in Chapter 4.  The research  reported in Chapter 4 presents 
very major ecological, external and internal validity problems. 
 
A Study Involving Legal Rather Than Fact Decisions and One-sided Presentation of 
Evidence  
 Chapter 5 describes an experiment ostensibly testing whether individual jurors and 
deliberating juries can accurately assess whether liability for punitive damages is warranted. The 
respondents in the experiment were provided with four case synopses and asked to determine if the 
cases met the legal requirements for liability. The deliberations of the simulating jurors were 
videotaped and subsequently analyzed. In three of the four cases the majority of the jurors decided 
in favor of the plaintiff, suggesting, the authors proclaim, a pro-plaintiff tilt.140 The Chapter 
concludes, in part, that “the tendency to find the defendant liable was partly due to juries’ failure to 
systematically consider the full set of legally necessary conditions of the verdicts they 
rendered.”141 It further concludes that jurors displayed low levels of comprehension and memory 
for information conveyed in legal instructions.142 The authors make the following assertion: “We 
believe that the essential finding, disturbingly poor comprehension, is a valid description of what 
occurs in actual jury trials, although this conclusion is based on our mock-jury simulation, which is 
far from courtroom conditions.”143   
                                                 
140 In Chapter 5 this assumption is not made explicitly but in the original article upon which the chapter is based , see 
Hastie et al, A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 LAW 
AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 287 (1998), the authors made a number of statements implying anti-defendant attitudes on the 
part of juries. At the beginning of their article they claimed: “What is incontrovertible is that in a nonnegligible 
number of cases juries render distinctly harsh antidefendant judgments and set dramatically large awards,” at 288. In 
interpreting their results the authors concluded that “In the cases we studied individual jurors exhibited a persistent 
tendency to favor plaintiffs, concluding that punitive damages were warranted when judges had concluded they were 
not,” at 306. The article further speculated that “possibly sympathy for injured plaintiffs led them to ignore essential 
legal considerations,” at 307 and “Furthermore, if as we have suggested, there is a bias in jury decisions against 
unsympathetic defendants and in favor of injured plaintiffs, increasing the requisite standard of proof should help 
reduce the rate of improper verdicts,” at 308. In a rejoinder and critique of that article, Vidmar, Juries Don’t Make 
Legal Decisions! And Other Problems: A Critique of Hastie et al. on Punitive Damages,  23 LAW AND HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 705, at 712 (1999), I pointed out that the presumption that jury awards favoring plaintiffs do not allow a 
conclusion of anti-defendant biases as the authors presumed ,but merely that the decisions were against the defendants.    
141 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 77.  
142 Id. at 92. 
143 Id. at 92. 
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 How far was the simulation from courtroom conditions? Chapter 5 is based on an article 
that was published previously. 144  In an article published in 1999  I offered  a number of serious 
grounds of criticism.145   
Most important,  I pointed out that there is a fatal conceptual flaw bearing on legal 
relevance in the underlying assumption of the experiment. The simulating jurors were asked to 
make decisions about whether punitive damages should be allowed. However, the decisions that 
the subjects were asked to make were decisions that fell within the province of the trial judge, not 
the jury. 146 The case synopses provided to the simulating jurors were ones in which the decision of 
the trial judge to allow or not allow punitive damages was appealed. In each case an appeals court 
decided that the trial judge, as a gatekeeper on legal issues, should not have permitted the jury to 
consider punitive damages. Juries make fact decisions, not legal decisions. As a consequence, the 
experiment lacks legal relevance.147   
While the above flaw in legal reasoning underlying the experiment is sufficient grounds for 
dismissing Chapter 5 in its entirety, additional problems with the research are worth pointing out. 
The experiment created artificial and truncated conditions somewhat similar to the experiments 
discussed above.148 The jurors were told that liability and compensatory damages had already been 
                                                 
144 Hastie et al, A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 LAW 
AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 287 (1998). 
145 Vidmar, supra note 11. Additional debate and a reply by the authors Hastie et al. accompanied that article: Hastie et 
al., Reply to Vidmar, 23 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 715(1999); Phoebe Ellsworth, Sticks and Stones, 23 LAW AND 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 719(1999); Robert MacCoun, Epistemological Dilemmas in the Assessment of Legal Decision 
Making,  23 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 723 (1999). 
146 Vidmar supra note 11.  
147 Id. at 706-710.  The authors of  Chapter 5 claim that reliance on the court decision in those cases is not the test of 
juries decisions but that was not always so, see Vidmar’s critique of the original article, supra note 11 at 707-710. 
Moreover, Professor Feigenson’s review, supra note 21, has pointed out that the authors of Chapter 5 do seem to 
intend that the reader infer that the discrepancies between their simulating jurors responses and the actual judicial 
outcomes are the appropriate standard. Feigenson at 246, observed: 
“…the authors [of Punitive Damages] do seem to intend that readers infer from the discrepancies between 
experimental and actual outcomes that the mock juries that voted for punitives erred. They write that they 
chose the four cases ‘because they are frequently cited as precedents, and because the proper action on the 
issue of punitive damages had been decided as a matter of law by trial or appellate court review of the 
original proceedings’  (p.80)(emphasis added by Feigenson), implying that the actual cases create a reliable 
benchmark after all. More directly, they write that ‘discussion of issues that were legally relevant reduced the 
tendency to decide, incorrectly, that the punitive damages were warranted” (p.90) (emphasis added by 
Feigenson). 
 Moreover, as I pointed out in my original critique of that research, Vidmar, supra note 11at 709-710, in two of the 
cases used in the experiment the trial and appellate judges struggled over the issue of whether, under the law, punitive 
damages were permissible and were not unanimous in their conclusions; and in the other two cases the issues were 
close enough to encourage plaintiff lawyers to file an appeal against the trial judge’s decision to disallow punitives.  
 
148 Vidmar, supra note 11.  
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decided and they were only to decide if the evidence supported a finding that punitive damages 
were warranted.149 Thus, there is again the problem of ecological validity because the simulating 
jurors did not hear or decide the first part of the case and had a very minimalist version of the facts 
and arguments. In addition there are major problems that compromise the experiment’s internal 
validity. 
The four cases selected to present to the simulating jurors provided only instances in which 
the appeal courts concluded that punitives were impermissible under the law. The experiment did 
not provide the jurors with comparable cases in which appeals courts determined that punitive 
damages were warranted. Would jurors provided with these alternative cases have decided punitive 
damages were not warranted? In short an experiment testing whether juries would decide the law 
in the same way as judges would have provided juries with “permissible” cases as well as 
“impermissible” cases and allowed a test of whether the jurors’ decisions showed a pro-
plaintiff/anti-defendant tilt.150  Of course, from a practical standpoint devising such an experiment 
would only serve to satisfy appropriate experimental rigor since the experiment would still be 
legally irrelevant.  
There is still more. The simulating jurors also deliberated as well as rendered individual 
verdicts. The authors concluded that deliberations produced a tilt in favor of finding that punitive 
damages were warranted. The critique which I made of the original article drew attention to the 
fact that by including “hung juries,” that is, those who could not reach unanimous verdict in the 
allotted time, the researchers inflated the number of juries favoring punitive damages.151 Since the 
burden of proof is on the plaintiff, hung juries should count as favoring no punitives. When the 
data are adjusted for this inappropriate counting, the number of juries favoring punitive damages 
was only 58 percent. From this insight one could make a plausible argument that, on average, the 
experimental juries tended to be relatively comparable to the various judges involved in these 
cases who did not garner consensus on the question of whether punitive damages were 
warranted.152    
In reviewing that study again I now offer a further criticism. Similar to the experiments 
reported in Chapters 2 and 3, the trial materia ls, at least as reflected in the example provided in 
                                                 
149 Hastie et al, supra note138. 
150 Vidmar, supra note 11 at 710. 
151 Vidmar , supra note 11at 710. 
152 See discussion in note 146 supra, and Vidmar , supra note 11 at 710. 
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Chapter 5 and in the original article upon which Chapter 5 is based, was heavily biased in favor of 
the plaintiff. That case summary, Jardel Company, Inc. v. K. Hughes,153 consisted of 28 
sentences.154  All of those sentences presented the plaintiff’s side of the story. Two additional 
sentences presented the plaintiff’s arguments in favor of punitive damages.155 The defendant’s 
arguments against punitive damages consisted of three sentences.156 In total, then, the case 
summary consisted of 30 sentences favoring the plaintiff and three sentences presenting the 
defendant’s side of the case, or a 10:1 ratio of plaintiff information to defendant information. 157 
Thus, again in this experiment, we see that the stimulus materials were heavily slanted toward a 
finding for the plaintiff. Perhaps such an imbalance of information sometimes occurs in real world 
punitive damages cases, but the imbalance in the evidence presented to the jurors is unremarked by 
the authors of Punitive Damages158although it seems obvious that such an imbalance of 
information could--and I submit, probably does-- explain the pro-plaintiff tilt in the data.  
In summary, there are major problems in making inferences from the experiments reported 
in Chapter 5 that involve legal relevance, ecological validity and internal validity.   
 
Mandated Deterrence and Risk Analysis Experiments Using “Fourteen- Sentence” Trials 
The authors of the research in punitive damages appear to be committed to a law and 
economics view that the purpose of punitive damages should be primarily (perhaps exclusively) to 
deter behavior, rather than also considering the retributive or moral role that punitive damages may 
serve. For example, in a reply to a critique of one of their earlier experiments Professors Hastie and 
Viscusi stated: “We have described the juror as a risk manager because we believe that the most 
useful framework within which to understand the punitive damages decision is to view it as a 
governing mechanism that is aimed to deter or control behavior that reduces the general social 
                                                 
153 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 93-95. The original case is Jardel Company, Inc. v. K. Hughes, Del. Supr., 523A 2d 518 
(1987). 
154 I count the sentences beginning with “ The specifics of the case” on page 93 and end with the sentence just before 
the simulating jurors are told that plaintiff Hughes was compensated for her expenses on page 94.  
155 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 94. 
156 Id. at 95.  
157 The jury instructions involved 19 sentences , see Hastie et al., supra note 142 at 310-311.  
158 The authors do not present the other case summaries in their published research and I have not obtained them to 
ascertain if they are the same length but Hastie et al., supra note 141 at 291, indicate that summaries ranged between 
1000 to 1500 words in length,  
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welfare.”159 Although this view is qualified somewhat in Punitive Damages160 it remains a 
significant theme in the book.  
Three chapters in Punitive Damages report experiments assessing whether respondents can 
appropriately respond to instructions that bear on the probability of deterrence.161 In one 
experiment reported in Chapter 8 samples of jury-eligible citizens and samples of law students 
were given brief case summaries that varied the probability of a defendant’s tortious behavior 
being detected.162 Following case synopses involving an injured person, respondents in the 
experiment were given the following instructions: 
In situations like this, the victims who deserve compensation do not 
always receive it because (1) they don’t know what caused their problem 
and therefore don’t sue, (2) they don’t know that they can sue, or (3) they 
sue and lose, even though they deserve to win under the law , because 
their lawyers are not good enough. Research has shown that in only 1 out 
of 100 situations where someone has an experience like Joan Glover is the 
company eventually required to pay compensation to the victim.163  
 
Each respondent judged three cases, each of which varied the probability of detection. 164 
Although there was a trend for the likelihood of detection to affect dollar judgments it was not 
statistically significant and was in a direction opposite to the predicted direction, 165 causing the 
authors to conclude that changes in the probability of detection did not affect the amounts 
awarded.  
 From the reported instructions it appears that the respondents in the experiment 
were not asked to assume the role of jurors, but rather to merely indicate their awards. This poses a 
serious problem. In a critique of an earlier experiment in the Exxon corpus of research, also 
                                                 
159  Reid Hastie and W. Kip Viscusi, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damages Awards: Reply to Richard Lempert. 51 
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 983, 994 (2002). They further added that in response to Professor Lempert’s view and that of 
others  that part of the reason is that , “…we are unable to spell out a clear rationale for the moral role of the jury or a 
method to evaluate the moral quality of jurors’ judgments, at 995. 
160 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 109: “These ideas [optimal deterrence being the primary aim of punitive damages] are 
controversial and we do not as a group, intend to take a position on them here.” 
161 PUNITIVE DAMAGES, Chapters 7, 8 and 9.  
162 Id. at 136. 
163 Id. 
164 The design was a randomized repeated measures design, commonly used in psychological research. Repeated 
measures designs are appropriate ways of assessing the effects of various conditions but the process of  decision-
making may be influenced by the respondent knowing that more than one decision has to be made. This is not 
necessarily a fatal flaw in the design but in this case note that jurors decide only one case, not several. See note 
__supra and accompanying text. 
165PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 137: “ To be sure, there does appear to be a positive trend in the means, but this difference is 
not statistically significant –and even if it were, it is in the opposite direction to the deterrence argument….”   
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dealing with judgments of risk,166 Richard Lempert obtained the questionnaires and raw data from 
the experiment.167 He noted a major methodological flaw affecting the experiment’s internal 
validity, namely that rather than receiving identical instructions respondents in one condition were 
told to respond as ordinary citizens while in another they were told to assume the role of jurors.168  
Lempert’s reanalysis of the data showed substantial differences between jurors assigned to the role 
of jurors compared to persons who received the same instructions who were not assigned to the 
role of jurors.169 While we cannot say whether or how the instructions in Experiment 1 might have 
produced different effects if the respondents had been instructed to take the role of jurors, 
Lempert’s finding raises serious questions about both its external and ecological validity. 170  
A second “experiment” in Chapter 8 involved a survey of law students at the University of 
Chicago.171  They were asked if about the degree to which they agreed with the optimal deterrence 
approach to punitive damages by responding to a scenario involving reckless employer safety 
practices. The students were not asked to assume the role of jurors. Strikingly, very strong 
majorities of the law students rejected a judicial ruling based on optimal deterrence, presumably 
because they believed “invidious behavior must be punished.”172  
The results of this second experiment bear on the results of research reported in Chapter 9 
that asked respondents to apply the Polinsky-Shavell mathematical formula based on optimal 
deterrence.173 Polinsky and Shavell set forth a mathematical formula based on optimal deterrence, 
namely that punishment levels should be based on the reciprocal of the probability of detection of 
negligent behavior.174 Those authors proposed model jury instructions using this formula. In the 
research reported in Chapter 9 samples of jury eligible adults were exposed to variations of a 
summary of an environmental accident case that varied the probability that the defendant’s tortious 
                                                 
166 Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgment in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Liability Judgments, CRJP Technical Report 
#376 (1998). Data from this experiment formed part of the data base cited in Hastie and Viscusi , What Juries Can’t 
Do Well: The Jury’s performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW 901 (1988).  
167 Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight Bias, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for 
Change, 48 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 825 867 (1999). 
168 Id. at 882-883. 
169 Id. 
170 It is also noteworthy that in analyzing other parts of the Hastie and Viscusi study, supra note 163, Lempert also 
showed that their data did not demonstrate that judges are less susceptible to hindsight biases than jurors, see Lempert , 
supra note 88at 883. 
171 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at Chapter 8, page 140. 
172 Id. at 140. 
173 The research reported in Chapter 9 was originally published in W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A 
Reckless Act? 52 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 547 (2000). 
174 A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
869 (1998).  
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behavior would be detected.175 The respondents were recruited for an opinion survey and were not 
allowed the option of considering the degree to which the behavior of the defendant deserved 
retributive punishment. The respondents were then presented with three personal injury case 
synopses. The longest of these three synopses consisted of fourteen sentences. One of the fourteen 
sentences told the jurors that a jury had already determined that the defendant was liable and had 
assessed compensatory damages. Without further instructions they were asked to specify the 
amount of punitive damages that they believed were appropriate. No other information was given 
about the rich factual context out of which the disputes arose, nor did the respondents have an 
opportunity to compare their individual views with those of other respondents. 
The respondents did not perform well in applying the Polinsky-Shavell hypothesis. It is not 
clear what implications this study reported in Chapter 9 has for real world juries. Aside from the 
limitations of the stimulus materials used for the trial the Polinsky-Shavell instructions do not 
correspond with the instructions that real world jurors are provided, there are additional problems. 
The first is that deterrence is only one goal of punitive damages and by artificially limiting the 
respondents’ decisions of optimal deterrence the experiment lacked ecological validity. Second, as 
Professor Feigenson has pointed out, the Polinsky-Shavell instructions are so complicated that we 
should not expect laypersons to be able to apply them readily.176 
 Indeed, Chapter 9 reports that “[a]lthough college graduates and those with professional 
degrees often did the survey in a manner that followed the Polinsky-Shavell instructions, a 
considerable portion of this group did not carry out these instructions.”177 The chapter further notes 
that [t]he experiment did not distinguish whether people were unable to implement these 
instructions or were unwilling to follow these instructions.” 178 The second experiment of Chapter 
8 suggests that at least some of the problem with the experiment in Chapter 9 may have been 
related to basic beliefs that invidious conduct deserves retributive punishment. These beliefs may 
have interfered with any calculations the respondents were asked to make or perhaps they were just 
unwilling to apply the deterrence formula.179  
                                                 
175 The research was previously published in Sunstein et al. Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUDIES. 237 (2001). 
176 Feigenson, supra, note 21 at 272-276. 
177 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 162. Note that the students were from the University of Chicago, an institution noted for its 
emphasis on law and economics. 
178 Id at 163. 
179 Feigenson, supra  note21  at 271-276 makes this same point in much greater detail. 
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It is noteworthy that other jury decision-making research indicates that when trial judges as 
well as jurors are asked to apply probabilistic formulas in abstract settings they tend to perform 
poorly. 180  On the other hand bodies of research indicate that when decisions are made in the 
context of concrete examples and settings, lay persons can make relatively accurate probabilistic 
judgments.181 Given the complexity and artificiality of the research reported in Chapter 9 as well 
as the fact that the stimulus materials do not correspond with actual conditions under which real 
juries operate or with legal doctrine providing for retributive as well as deterrent purposes of 
punishment the application of these findings to legal policy are difficult to discern.  
 
Summarizing: Experimental Simulations and Experimental Validity in Perspective 
The conclusion to Punitive Damages refers to the twenty empirical studies reported in the 
volume and asserts that “[t]hese experimental tests were conducted on thousands of jury-eligible 
citizens, on hundreds of mock juries, and on a few hundred experienced trial judges asked to 
render punitive damages verdicts under legally realistic task conditions.”182  By focusing on the 
actual methodological details of the experiments we can see that more than a few questions need to 
be raised about the meaning of “legally realistic.” The gap between the experiments and the 
conditions under which real world juries operate is wide and deep. Moreover, in some instances 
the experiments presented such one-sided presentations of facts that serious questions can be raised 
about the causal inferences the authors drew from their data. 
The artificiality of experimental jury simulations has raised many questions about the 
extent to which generalizations can be made to actual jury verdicts.183 In a comprehensive review 
of jury research methodology Robert MacCoun pointed out that while simulation experiments can 
shed light on how variables probably influence verdicts, [w]hen the objective is to estimate 
precisely the magnitude of trends and patterns in actual jury trials, …archival analysis [such as 
                                                 
180 For a review of these studies see Neil Vidmar and Shari Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOKLYN LAW 
REVIEW 1121 (2001) at 1134-1139,1149-1158 
181 Id. 
182 PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 211. 
183  See 3 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR, combined issue 1/2 (1979); Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury 
Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out? 23 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 75 (1999); Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows 
from Jury Simulation, 21 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 561 (1997)..  
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those “real world” studies discussed in the first section of this article]  is more appropriate. The 
role of mock- jury experimentation is to explain those patterns.”184 
It is important to re-emphasize that my critique of Punitive Damages should not be taken as 
a general indictment of experimental simulation research on juries. Beginning in the1970s 
researchers began conducting experiments on juries.185 Many of these experiments used trial 
stimulus materials that were as spare in detail as the ones used in Punitive Damages. However, a 
second generation of experiments quickly arose and became more sophisticated in taking 
cognizance of legal policy matters and the richness of the jury’s factual environment, including 
judicial constraints on juries. Researchers developed theories about jury behavior, tied those 
theories to broader bodies of psychological research and checked their results against real world 
studies. Ironically, a series of jury simulation studies by one of the authors of Punitive Damages 
resulted in the “story model” of juror decision making processes186 that supplanted earlier models 
of jury decision making and is, unquestionably, not only the prevailing theory today, but one that 
garners considerable support from real world data as well as from many other experiments, some 
using minimalist trial materials and others using much more sophisticated jury simulations. Taken 
together the incremental knowledge gained from the large body of simulation studies does provide 
a basis for assisting legal policy makers.187 
One problem (though I hasten to add, not the only problem) with Punitive Damages is the 
lack of follow-through experiments that assess plausible alternative hypotheses.188 Consider the ad 
damnum experiment reported in Chapter 4. Putting aside the biased facts favoring plaintiffs in the 
stimulus materials, it would be reasonable to conduct a first experiment looking only at the effect 
of the plaintiff’s ad damnum request because the researcher might want to simply isolate only the 
effects of the plaintiff’s request. However, careful researchers would have followed up with 
additional experiments seeking to find out about the potentially countervailing effects of  
                                                 
184  Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking By Civil 
Juries. In Robert Litan, ed., VERDICT : ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM (1993). 
185I See generally, Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups 7 
PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY AND LAW 622 (2001), Edie Greene and Brian Bornstein, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS (2003); Neal Feigenson, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT 
ACCIDENTS (2000); Valerie Hans, BUSINESS ON TRIAL (2000).  
186Reid  Hastie, Stephen Penrod  and Nancy  Pennington, Inside the Jury (1983); Pennington and Hastie: A Cognitive 
Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 519 (1991).  
187 See, e.g., Smith, How Jurors Make Decisions: the Value of Trial Innovations, in G.T. Munsterman et al, eds.,  Jury 
Trial Innovations (1997); B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and 
Democratic Juries, 68 Indiana Law Journal 1229 (1993);   
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testimony  and defense rebuttal that occur in real trials. Contrast Punitive Damages’ one-shot-
draw-policy-conclusions model of research with the series of experiments by Saks and his co-
authors and by Greene and Bornstein, as I discuss in my critique of Chapter 4.189 These other 
researchers did look at the effects of defense counter proposals and the effects of defense experts 
and arrived at considerably different conclusions from those in Punitive Damages.   
Consistent with MacCoun’s view most researchers are careful in generalizing from 
experimental simulations like those in Punitive Damages.  Greene and Bornstein’s important book, 
Determining Damages, reviewed simulation research on jury decision making on damages, 
including one of the studies of the Exxon group. In a chapter devoted to reforming damage award 
decision-making, they stated: “…because we simply do not yet know enough, we urge policy 
makers and court reformers to tread lightly over this ground that seems ever-shifting and decidedly 
unstable.”190 
As if to put a punctuation point on the Greene and Bornstein’s conclusion  Professor 
Jennifer Robbennolt reviewed the overall corpus of experimental research on juries and punitive 
damages in a recent article to reach the following conclusion: 
The research examining the processes by which jurors determine punitive 
damages suggests that jurors take into account important characteristics of 
the cases in making their punitive awards…. [J]urors do not appear to 
make decisions that clearly differ from the decisions that judges would 
make, certainly not to the extent that most critics of the jury would 
suggest.”191 
 
V.  Other Perspectives Bearing on Overreaching Policy Claims in Punitive Damages 
I have already drawn attention to the fact that Professors Sharkey and Feigenson, after 
reviewing Punitive Damages, separately concluded that its authors have gone beyond their data in 
making policy recommendations about juries and punitive damages. Professor Feigenson, for 
example, stated, “…at many points in [Punitive Damages’] presentation the data do not support 
[the authors’] critical view of punitive damages as strongly as they would have readers believe.”192 
In an extremely thorough review of one of the experiments that preceded the book 
Professor Richard Lempert concluded:     
                                                 
189 Supra at text around notes___ 
190  Edie Greene and Brian Bornstein, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS (2003). 
191 Jennifer Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFFALO 
LAW REVIEW 103, 158 (2002). 
192 Feigenson , supra note 21 at 242. 
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The authors …do not make an adequate social science case for change [the 
authors’ recommendation that juries should not decide punitive damages], 
and their recommendation that this should be done deserves no weight in 
any policy arenas.193  
 
In the original article containing the experiment that forms the basis of Chapter 9194 
Professor Viscusi drew attention to “the fundamental irrationality that juries display with respect to 
punitive damage awards” and suggested that proposals to have judges rather than juries award 
punitive damages would remedy the problem. 195  Steven Garber assessed the experiment’s 
conceptual adequacy and the methodological soundness of its simulations, concluding that “[t]he 
supporting argument and evidence are far from compelling,” and that its author’s conclusion about 
juries was  “a key policy recommendation that lacks foundation”196 Responding to the same article 
Robert MacCoun wrote, “Viscusi’s data on their own are clearly too modest to support his 
sweeping call to either remove punitive damages judgments  from the jury or eliminate punitive 
damages altogether.”197   
  
VI. Conclusion 
 
Judges and other legal policy makers need to avoid “grasshopper” tendencies in responding 
to the corpus of work reported in Punitive Damages. Various critics of the research have drawn 
attention to its conceptual and methodological weaknesses and the inappropriateness of the broad 
policy recommendations set forth by the authors of those experiments. This article has drawn 
                                                 
193  Richard Lempert,, supra note 88 at 870.  
194  Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act? 52 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 547 (2000). 
195 Id. at 589. In fairness, Professor Viscusi has responded to an earlier draft of the present article  by saying that he has 
never advocated the general abolition of punitive damages.  In a personal  email communication ( March 17, 2004, on 
file with the author) he drew my attention to the fact that he qualified his view in the  Stanford article by referencing 
his earlier writings advocating only that punitive damages should be abolished for corporate safety  and environmental 
torts.  Professor Viscusi pointed out that on page 589 of the article he stated that “Elsewhere , I have proposed 
abolishing punitive damages for corporate safety and environmental torts,” and referred to his earlier articles in the 
Georgetown Law Journal. In the email he clarified his position by stating, 
“My proposal there is to eliminate punitive damages for specific matters covered by existing federal health , 
safety, and environmental regulations. Thus, if auto airbags met government standards, then plaintiffs could 
not obtain punitive damages for injuries caused by airbags. But the fact that NHTSA exists to regulate auto 
safety does not mean that every auto safety problem is free of possible punitive damages since not every 
design issue is addressed by specific regulations.”   
196 Steven Garber, Punitive Damages and Efficiency-promoting Analysis: A Problem with a Solution? 52 STANFORD 
LAW REVIEW 1809, 1810 (2000). 
197 Robert MacCoun , The Costs and Benefits of Letting Juries Punish Corporations : Comment on Viscusi, 52 
STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1821,1827 (2000) 
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attention to the failure of the authors of Punitive Damages to confront real world data that is 
inconsistent with their claims. Then, by focusing on the concepts of internal, external and 
ecological validity it has confronted the simulation experiments on their own terms. 
Deconstruction of the methodologies of the experiments demonstrates that they have 
serious and incontrovertible failings, including limitations of the experimental simulations in 
comparison to real world juries and biases built into the research materials that did not give a fair 
test of how jurors might respond to evidence. Considered in conjunction with critiques of Punitive 
Damages or individual experiments in the corpus of Exxon–funded research that have been set 
forth by other authors, it is abundantly clear that Punitive Damages should not be treated as 
empirical authority for individual cases or for tort reform generally.       
